My discussion of the inherent immorality of drone killing will first examine several arguments to the effect that remote-control killing as risk-free killing is inherently wrong. I find these arguments to be largely inadequate and maintain that the more important issue is that drone operators live in a "separate world" from their targets. Killing from outside the geographical zone of one's adversaries may not be intrinsically wrong, but, among other problems, it tends to turn the whole world into a conflict zone and involves a wrong prioritizing of troop protection above civilian protection. Next, I will argue that the "deadly surveillance" aspect of drone killing, which has received much less attention than the remote control aspect, is inherently immoral. More specifically, I will argue that the detailed observation of the targeted individual as a person rather than as a threat, as is typical in the process leading up to drone killing, makes this killing immoral. Looking toward the future, it seems that the drone as a "deadly surveillance" system will become a fearful instrument of control. In conclusion, I will discuss the significance of the "deadly surveillance" dimension of drone warfare in making the case for an international ban on weaponized UAVs and lethal robots.
War Made Easy
Jeff McMahan has recently argued that the targeted killing by drones of militants who are planning terrorist attacks is morally similar to the killing of combatants (soldiers in uniform) who participate in a war of aggression but are asleep. 5 The aggressor combatants have a legal right to kill just combatants, while terrorists lack the legal right to kill their intended targets. But both of them lack a moral right to kill their adversaries since they both wrongly intend to be instrumental in killing persons who have done nothing to warrant this fate. 6 We may therefore kill both types of aggressors in order to prevent wrongful harm from being inflicted. I will later contest some aspects of McMahan's moral equivalency argument. Now it suffices to note that his argument gives credibility to the view that terrorists may pose the type of threat that may morally warrant lethal force. Just resort to military force, however, requires also that the threat has a magnitude large enough to warrant all the (often unexpected) costs of war and to 5 McMahan, "Targeted Killing," 137-41. McMahan speaks of unjust combatants, but aggression is the main reason that wars are unjust. He argues that targeted killing is typically illegal in terms of the war convention and that anti-terrorist action as law enforcement is bound to be ineffective. He concludes tentatively that anti-terrorism action should be based on a new body of law intermediate between the rules of law enforcement and the law of armed conflict. I will later briefly criticize this type of solution. 6 In the context of criticizing the so-called "moral equality" of combatants I will later in this paper briefly return to the claim that aggressor combatants have no moral right to kill. The claim is defended in detail in McMahan's work. See also my "Questioning Combatant's Privilege."
justify that non-hostile civilians die in the pursuit of military targets. Typically, the threats posed by terrorists remain under the threshold of just resort to military force, and the most common approach to terrorism has been to see it as a problem of law enforcement. To be sure, the horrific events of 9/11 gave some credibility to the idea that al-Qaeda posed a threat that was above the threshold necessary for war; however, by the time that the Obama administration in 2009 greatly stepped up the drone campaign in Pakistan this idea was much less credible since al-Qaeda had significantly weakened and no new terrorist attacks against the United States had occurred or been plotted of such a scope so as to view law-enforcement methods as largely inadequate. In fact, most drone strikes under Obama have not been launched against al-Qaeda and identified terrorist leaders ("high-value targets") but against suspected low-level militants with local aims, often in "signature strikes" in which all men fitting the profile of militant are targeted. 7 Thus, the drone campaign in Pakistan has less to do with protecting the American people from terrorism, as Obama has maintained, and more with winning the war in Afghanistan by weakening support coming from the FATA for the Afghanistan Taliban, assisting Pakistan in its conflict with local militant groups, and maintaining U.S. military hegemony. The deceptive justification is "good" politics since no administration wants to appear weak on terrorism, and what has enabled this kind of deception is that the drone campaign, as a limited form of warfare with "no boots on the ground," has been largely executed in secrecy and without much democratic oversight.
Drone warfare is a considerable facilitator of what Cheyney Ryan has called "alienated war," that is, war as a collective activity that no longer requires public sacrifice and moral commitment. 8 The volunteer army, the use of private military contractors, the technology of cruise missiles, and, now, drone warfare, are all steps toward normalizing war for U.S. citizens:
war no longer feels like war, it no longer disrupts everyday life, and, so, war becomes acceptable, even when it is not fought for "liberty" or "protecting the American people" or when these aims no longer appear as convincing to many. Long-term "boots on the ground" with growing numbers of American casualties, though more easily accepted in the case of a volunteer army than with conscription, threatens the normalization of war, as the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq have illustrated, but there is no such casualty problem in drone warfare. Weaponized drones also assist in making conventional wars less risky and costly, as illustrated by the NATO intervention in Libya. No troops on the ground were necessary for "success" in this military intervention, and this played a role in Obama simply announcing the intervention, rather than 7 Signature strikes also occurred under the Bush administration. In "Only 4% of drone victims," Serle reports that as of October 2014 only one-third of those killed have been named (703 out of 2,379), and that of this named group, 295 have been identified as members of some armed group, including 84 alQaeda members (4% of the total killed) and 111 senior commanders (5% of the total killed). 2009, 11% in 2010, 14% in 2011, 7% in 2012, as low as 0% in 2013 and 2014, and 3% in 2015 . These figures are derived from comparing the minimum estimated number of civilian deaths each year to the minimum estimated number of total deaths. The percentage of civilian deaths for each year would be much lower (in most years) if one compares the minimum number of civilian deaths to the maximum of total deaths and much higher if one compares the maximum number of civilian deaths to the minimum of total deaths. Thus the range of percentages is 14-45% for 2009, 8-26% for 2010, 8-42% for 2011, 3-32% for 2012, 0-4% for 2013, 0-2% in 2014, and 3-8% in 2015 . The numbers are much higher for the Bush drone campaign (51 strikes during 2004-08): 40%, with a range of 28-81%. 13 My comments here have profited from Kreps and Kaag, "The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." militants put on its killing lists (in "personality strikes") is shrouded in secrecy and mischaracterization might occur. Moreover, misidentification might occur when local informants for financial or political gain provide inaccurate intelligence. 14 The frequent occurrences of "signature strikes" add greatly to the problem that many of those killed are mischaracterized by the Obama administration as militants. What the public at large also ignores in its comfortable belief that drones only harm "terrorists" is that the frequent presence of drones in the sky terrifies the local population and interferes with their daily activities.
The Dangers of Proliferation and Future Drone Developments
The drone campaign in Pakistan is not only beset with moral and political pitfalls but is also in violation of international law: notably, the unilateral right to self-defense, as stated in The standards permit a drone attack against a terrorist only if capture is not feasible, local authorities will not or cannot take effective measures to deal with the "imminent threat to U.S. persons," and there is "near certainty that the terrorist target is present" and "near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed."
The Obama administration has mostly ignored these standards and, if literally interpretedfor example, when "imminent" is really taken to mean "imminent"-they seem to preclude almost all current targeted drone killing. Still, the issue at stake remains whether articulation of new legal rules for targeted killing (intermediate between the war and law-enforcement models of using force) might not be a promising way of addressing the threat of terrorism. One concern with this approach is that it will actually further contribute to the normalization of war in that it allows for killing on a scale typically associated with war, and no longer calling it war would reduce moral scrutiny of targeted killing by drones. Another clear cost of the approach is that it would hasten what the United States is already affecting: the proliferation of weaponized drones and their increased future use for targeted killing. The United Kingdom has used weaponized drones in Afghanistan, as has Israel in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. China and Iran have long-range weaponized drones; at least a handful of other countries, including India, Russia, and Turkey are actively developing them; and many more countries are developing shortrange sophisticated surveillance drones that could be eventually armed. 19 Recently, the Obama administration has approved selling weaponized drones to allies. 20 Pakistan has tested laser-guided missiles for its own drones, as a step toward "eradicating militant groups." 21 So, soon we might be living in a world where many countries would be engaged in targeted killing by drones of terrorists in contested regions of their country or of terrorists operating from other (often neighboring) countries. How carefully would these strikes be conducted in terms of minimizing civilian casualties? And how carefully would the targets be selected? The track record of the United States with regard to these issues is such that we should have little confidence in other countries coming to embrace a strict legal regime of targeted killing by drones. Granted, some international court could oversee counterterrorist actions across the globe and then punish those states that engage in targeted killing of persons who do not plan terrorist acts or execute targeted killing with a high proportion of civilians killed, but how likely is it that such an agency would be implemented and function effectively? In short, the cost of trying to normalize and legalize targeted killing by drones seems to outweigh any additional gain this might have in terms of reducing terrorist threats as compared to treating terrorist activity as a criminal activity to be dealt with by (international) law enforcement. And it should be noted that the comparative benefits are contested in the first place, at least with regard to current targeted killing. Due to its strong local public disapproval, targeted killing, such as in the FATA in Pakistan, may create new terrorist recruits. It may also lead to attacks on the American mainland, as I will later discuss.
Nonstate actors (Hezbollah and Hamas) have already used weaponized drones, and the proliferation of drones, even if guided by some new legal paradigm, will likely mean that nonstate actors will increasingly use more sophisticated weaponized drones. Further, the United
States is developing stealth drones and drones with air-to-air attack capabilities (the X-47B), and Europe is following suit with its combat drone the "Neuron" (nEUROn). Other developments in the U.S. military pipeline include the miniaturization of UAVs (micro killer drones), drones operating in swarms, and weaponized underwater uninhabited vehicles (UUVs). Human operators of lethal drones have limits of concentration, duration, and processing data, and so with the continuous spread and development of drones there will be growing pressure to taking humans out of the loop or severely restricting their role. 22 The resulting autonomous lethal systems will add to the problems of "war made easy" and the destabilization of international relations. Robotic killers have no allegiance and will kill at the command of all those who can afford them. Even if they somehow could be so programmed to uphold the rules of war, they have no interest in doing so, and unscrupulous owners of killer robots will unleash them notwithstanding their "moral" failings. Also, fighting robotic killers is a losing proposition, and, so, in a world in which there will be fewer human combatants to fight, civilians will increasingly become intentional targets.
All in all, the logic of current drone warfare is a logic that sets the world on a path toward intensified and globalized warfare. Huge investments in drone warfare and robotic warfare will also have great opportunity costs, especially for countries with weak or emerging economies. An international treaty banning weaponized drone warfare, including a prohibition of their development into lethal autonomous systems, is, therefore, imperative. However, since predictions of future costs and adverse developments are uncertain, while the seeming benefits of drone warfare for countries presently in possession of drones are immediate, the case for such a treaty would be strengthened if it could be shown that drone killing is as such morally suspect or even plainly inherently immoral as a technology of killing.
On the Immorality of Killing by Drones (A): Remote Control Killing
The point of McMahan's claim that targeted killing by drones and killing a sleeping soldier are morally similar is that the war convention allows the killing of combatants who are not immediate threats to those who do the killing. The sleeping soldier is a future threat, and so is the terrorist who is killed by the drone operator. The two cases, however, are dissimilar in that terrorists, unlike sleeping soldiers, are difficult to identify as agents who pose a future threat.
More importantly (for my present purpose), the cases are dissimilar in that only the drone operator is in a risk-free environment, while the typical scenario of killing sleeping soldiers, say, a nighttime surprise attack on enemy soldiers, cannot be so described. In a recent article on warrior virtues and drone killing, Robert Sparrow notes that "there is something inherently dishonorable about killing people one is observing on a video screen from thousands of kilometers away and who have no opportunity to return fire. The absence of danger to the operator, as well as the power of the sensors and weapons they command, seems to make killing too easy to be called honorable. religiously important, and personally rewarding, but all these "meanings" of war have no moral justificatory force with regard to resort to war. And, surely, it is wrong to insist that the just combatant somehow must increase risk to self in order to gain in terms of the various "meanings" of war.
Riza also maintains that "the horrible individual act of ordering young men and women to risk all is part of a far larger scheme that communicates what really matters to a nation." He continues: "The willingness to drive them into battle . . . says that for which we fight is important enough that we are willing to risk the future lives of our budding youth in order to achieve it. . . .
Without the willingness to risk greatly, we have no business making decisions about others' mortality." 27 In my view, Riza is correct in claiming that risk to soldiers is, or at least should be, a barrier to fighting for unworthy goals, but we have already discussed the problem that risk-free war may result in resort to force for purposes below the threshold for just war. This problem does not show that risk-free war as such is morally wrong. However, Riza also seems to suggest in the passage just cited that willingness to die is a necessary condition for having the right to kill others. He hints at an explanation for this claim elsewhere in his book when he approvingly cites Michael Walzer arguing with regard to the Kosovo air campaign that the decision at the outset by the Clinton administration not to use ground forces was wrong because "You can't kill unless 24 you are prepared to die." 28 What Walzer seems to have in mind is that since war may end up killing enemy noncombatants, or lead to the killing of civilians whom just combatants seek to protect in a humanitarian intervention, just combatants must be prepared to risk their lives for the sake of reducing the risk to these vulnerable groups. In other words, troop protection is morally imperative, but it becomes wrong when it is clearly gained at the cost of harming and killing civilians. A moral danger of drones is that it makes this kind of wrong prioritizing an option difficult to resist since killing by drones is optimal in terms of troop protection. Still, drone killing could be limited to situations where it would lead to fewer civilian casualties than would the use of ground troops, and so the moral danger does not show that drone killing as such is wrong. In fact, defenders of drone killing have a point in claiming that the use of ground troops in Pakistan to engage in targeted killing would have led to greater civilian casualties than the ongoing drone campaign. 29 My disagreement with them is that I think that in neither form
American military force in Pakistan is justified.
A third argument by Riza is that risk-free killing undermines that combatants on both sides of a conflict view each other as moral equals. On his account, the mutual imposition of risk to be There are good reasons to uphold in our present political world the legal right to kill of combatants on both sides in a conflict, but it is implausible to maintain that mutual threat gives each party a moral right to kill. The aggressor combatants wrong their opponents and do not acquire a moral right to kill their opponents because the opponents shoot back in just self- 35 Richard A. Clark, who as National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism was a supporter of the weaponization of drones prior to 9/11, describes a fictional scenario of attacks on drone operators in Nevada by conventional means as well as "hobby" drones in his novel Sting of the Drone. Of course, the perpetrators succeed only in causing limited casualties (including some "collateral damage") and are soon apprehended or killed by the FBI and SWAT teams. All in all, the novel is an obvious attempt to make the American people accept that the drone war will have some "blowback." may be found, but also because of the possibility of counterattacks against the operators, analysts, supporting crews, etc., who are far from the target zones of drones. These counterattacks may disproportionately harm civilians or even only harm civilians once they turn into terrorist attacks. This is a significant potential cost of drone warfare (and, more broadly, of remote control and robotic warfare), and policy makers and the U.S. military should be blamed for seemingly ignoring it. The cost, however, does not show that the technology of drone killing is intrinsically immoral since the cost can be significantly mitigated by moving drone operators (ground control stations) far away from civilian centers or, more effectively, by placing them much closer to their targets. Indeed, drone operators involved in targeted killing have been stationed, for example, in
Iraq. Still, what makes drones effective is that the movements of the enemy can be observed from a safe point for long periods of time and then be disrupted at an opportune moment. So both the imperative of troop protection and the optimal functioning of drones point to the moral danger that civilians are not protected in a manner due to them.
The separation of drone operators from conflict zones has several other negative ramifications. 36 Since drone soldiers, unlike traditional soldiers, do not interact with enemy soldiers or local civilians, they are less likely to come to question misguided military campaigns, reinforcing how the absence of immediate personal risk reduces the incentive of drone soldiers to question their cause. The separation also impacts matters of war conduct. Remote control killers, like killers on the physical battlefield, see the harm they have caused, but it is also the case that the drone killers are only watching a monitor, that they watch without being seen, that they do not hear the sounds of suffering, and that they watch with others, and all these features seem to create emotional distance and with it moral distance and greater risk of moral indifference.
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Moreover, the killing is a result of team work, including the operators, numerous data analysts, and people higher up in the chain of command authorizing the killing, and so it is a type of "bureaucratic killing" that dilutes a sense of responsibility. What enhances the unreality of the 36 Sparrow convincingly shows that the separation prevents that drone operators acquire or exercise the warrior virtues of courage, honor, mercy, and loyalty. His concluding argument, however, is weak that this development is worrisome because these virtues are needed as a barrier to atrocity when sooner or later the U.S. will fight with "boots on the ground." See Sparrow, "War without Virtue?," 105. His questionable assumption is that the morality of remote control killing will come to prevail throughout the U.S. military even when it is still preparing for fighting ground battles. Riza expresses a somewhat similar, and perhaps more convincing, worry concerning how true military leaders can emerge from a growing pool of operationally deskilled cubicle and lab-coat warriors. See Riza, Killing without Heart, 98-106. 37 Cf. Gregory, "Drone Geographies," 9-10. harm is that the virtual battlefield experience is an interruption of everyday life with family, driving to and from work, and so on.
The people living under drones view drone killings as "cruel," "cowardly," and as "not fighting with honor." 38 Thus drone killings might lead people under attack to support the armed groups among them and also cause resentment toward the United States. War must lead to just peace, and the perception that a war is wrongly executed is an obstacle toward long-term reconciliation. Also, the fact that the opponents do not meet in a shared geographical space seems an obstacle to dialogue and understanding, again obscuring the prospects of peace. What adds to the problem is that drone warfare is an extreme form of asymmetric warfare. Or, more accurately, it is unidirectional "fighting," for even if the militants under attack could jam the signals to the drone or shoot it down, the operators themselves at that moment are still beyond reach. This one-sided "fighting" currently practiced by the United States cannot be separated from the colonialist, racist, and imperialist asymmetric killing of the recent past (say, machine guns killing en masse people resisting colonialization). Uwe Steinhoff writes: "Those black, yellow, or brown people might therefore have a somewhat different perspective on the alleged advantages by drones. They might think that it is bad enough to be treated like the barbarian enemies but, still worse, to be treated like cockroaches on the receiving side of pest control." 
On the Immorality of Drone Killing (B): Deadly Surveillance
In sum, the remote control nature of drone killing poses a variety of costs and moral dangers, but this does not mean that such killing is inherently immoral. Perhaps the unidirectional and extreme asymmetrical nature of drone killing might help to explain the intuition that this killing 38 Riza, Killing without Heart, 119. 39 Steinhoff, "Killing Them Safely," 206-07. 40 Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 95. 41 Cf. ibid., 155 is ignoble and morally suspect, but, in my view, the better explanation is to be found in the fact that drones are deadly surveillance platforms. What undermines the view that it is the risk-free, unidirectional, and extreme asymmetric nature of drone killing that makes it especially morally reprehensible is that killing by cruise missiles launched from a ship shares these characteristics
and, yet, this is not generally perceived as equally morally disconcerting. 42 Only drone killing involves detailed surveillance of the target, including post-strike observation, and so let me now address what the moral significance is of this surveillance.
We have noted that a drone attack is not similar to killing a sleeping soldier (say in a surprise attack) because, typically, only the former is done in a risk-free environment. Now it should be noted that targeted killing by drones is in some ways similar to the following rather unusual way of a soldier killing an enemy combatant: a soldier is behind louvered closet doors in the room of a sleeping high-ranked enemy soldier (or he might be behind a one-way mirror), watching him tossing and turning, going to the bathroom, getting a smoke, falling back to sleep, and then after many hours he steps outside the closet (or enters the room from behind the one- another Predator crew destroyed the truck a few days later. Looking back, Martin wrote: "The ability to kill people from such a distance, playing God, widened the gap between the reality of war and our perception of it. It was almost like watching an NFL game on TV with its tiny figures on the screen compared to being down there on the field in the mud and the blood in the rain getting your socks knocked off." 44 Martin continues to write that the ease of killing by drone, which even might turn out to be "mildly entertaining," left him somewhat unhinged, reinforced by the fact that after eight hours of war he drove home in a rather different reality. His wife, however, put him at ease, telling him that he was "saving lives" because killing on the ground would leave more people dead, both Americans and Iraqis. Martin's observations underline some earlier points about the unreality and ease of drone
killings, but what needs to be emphasized for my present purpose is his metaphor of playing God. The metaphor is first stated in the Prologue: "Sometimes I felt like God hurtling thunderbolts from afar." 45 Now one aspect of this metaphor is God as the one who takes life away at unexpected moments, but another aspect is that God watches us from above when he decides the moment of death. Martin has mixed feelings about his God-like vision. At one point, he writes: "I remained a voyeur in the sky snooping on peoples' lives. Increasingly cynical, I was suspicious of everyone." He goes on to give an example of his hyper-suspicion. He sees a group of men hunching in a circle in a park in Sadr City, smoking cigarettes. "The burning cigarettes became spectacular balls of radiation when viewed through an infrared camera." Toying with the idea that a terrorist cell was meeting here, Martin observed them holding hands and joking around. He writes: "I kept hoping somebody would pull out a rocket launcher. At least it would mean I was making good use of Predator's time and resources. Besides, blowing up things was much more interesting than watching men sit around in the dark smoking cigarettes, dancing, and holding hands." 46 But in the context of observing American soldiers and supporting them, Martin is more positive about his vision from above:
Each day through my cameras I snooped around and came to recognize the faces and figures of our soldiers and marines, unbeknownst to most of them. I sometimes chuckled over their youthful pranks. . . . I cried with them as well whenever they lost a comrade and they huddled together with their arms over one another's shoulders. Looking down on all this, seeing the foibles and courage and decency, and all the various behavior, emotions, and ways of mankind at its best and at its worst, I truly felt a bit like an omnipotent god with a god's seat above it all." insurgents in Iraq seemed to have been unaware of the drones watching them, he writes: "It was almost as if they were ants down there, predictable in their behavior [and] no more aware of the Predator's presence than they were of the Almighty watching them. In fact, they may have been more cognizant of Allah than of Predator. Allahu Akbar!" 48 Martin's personal drone pilot account illustrates that killing by drones involves detailed and long observation of those who will be killed, at times stretched out over days or even weeks. This aspect of intense surveillance is even more manifest in "man hunting," or targeted killing, in non-combat zones, especially, it would seem, in the case of so-called "high-valued targets."
Consider the targeted killing of Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban, on August 5,
2009
. 49 He was killed on the rooftop of his father-in-law's home in South Waziristan (in the FATA). At the moment of the drone strike, Mehsud, who suffered from kidney problems, was seen receiving an intravenous drip under the guidance of his uncle, and he was in the company of his father in-law, his mother-in-law, and his second wife. They were all killed, as well as seven bodyguards. Several other drone strikes were aimed at Mehsud in the preceding months, including an attack that killed one of his commanders, followed by an attack on the funeral of There is no doubt that Mehsud as a militant was responsible for many wrongful deaths and indiscriminate attacks, but what makes his killing by drones nonetheless morally wrong in my view is that Mehsud was killed as a medical patient under the care of his family. It was similarly wrong to try to kill him at a funeral. The drone operator saw Mehsud as a medical patient and then pulled the trigger. And the drone operator saw Mehsud (or so he assumed) and other militants in the process of mourning and then pulled the trigger. Of course, even if one were to assume that in these situations Mehsud was an appropriate target, both drone strikes were also in violation of the idea that due care should be taken to avoid unintended civilian deaths and that the number of civilian deaths should somehow be proportionate to the value of the target. are beings who have alienated themselves from us and our common humanity when they try to kill us. But in these moments of vulnerability, rest, and peace, the alienation disappears and the common humanity is recognized. Thus it becomes difficult to kill. Walzer argues that the refusals to kill here are not morally required; rather, they are "acts of kindness" and "involve doing less than is permitted."
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Perhaps Walzer is correct that the refusals to kill here are acts of kindness rather than strictly morally required since the recognition of a common humanity is a fleeting one in the examples:
the coffee break and the smoke soon end and the combatants return to being combatants; the pants are pulled up, the bath is finished, and the soldiers return to the trenches. 54 Perhaps one may set aside here the glance of humanity without deeply violating humanity in oneself. But the drone killings of militants showing their humanity are hardly fleeting moments; to the contrary, 50 Accordingly, drone killing is rather different from killing performed by snipers. Even when snipers operate in non-battlefield zones, their ability to track a person is comparatively very limited. Moreover, sniper killing is not unidirectional. Still, the killing performed by snipers has a personal and intimate component that is not uncommonly felt as morally disconcerting as compared to the more "at random" killing in most battlefield situations. 51 See Nagel, "War and Massacre." 52 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 143. 54 For an argument to the effect that Walzer is wrong in claiming that it is permissible to kill "naked soldiers," see May, War Crimes and Just War, humanity may be observed for a considerable amount of time before identification of the target is More generally, drones can be used to take out clear threats in conventional war zones, say, a strike against militants placing an improvised explosive device (IED) on a road under drone surveillance. Surely, drones may greatly assist ground troops in counterinsurgency, but here it seems that surveillance rather than deadly surveillance is their main benefit; for example, the IED and those responsible for planting it can be taken out by conventional military means. In fact, it often happens in war zones that platforms other than drones take out the targets identified by drones. 58 Accordingly, what makes weaponizing drones so "attractive" is that it greatly enables the killing of suspected militants at the moment that they are not in active combat against the United States. But it is precisely in those situations (which may occur in war zones and characterize non-war zones) that frequently militants will be killed by drones as persons rather than as threats.
The scope, but perhaps not the intensity, of this immoral form of killing will likely increase with the further development of drones as deadly surveillance systems, including such capabilities as the permanent surveillance of large areas with increased visual sharpness and detail, the recording of all activities within these areas, the constant analysis of these records, and the tracking of past conduct of those who are caught in the analysis as suspect. Improved listening devices will further increase the capability to control. Ironically, the greater the control through total surveillance, the fewer the occasions might be that killing is judged necessary to maintain control. Accordingly, repressive governments might come to use police drones with lethal capabilities for the sake of control of their own population. Even democratic states might be tempted to move in this direction for the sake of combatting terrorism in the "home land." The ongoing militarization of U.S. police forces adds to this danger, and it is likely that soon police drones with at least nonlethal weapons will patrol the American skies.
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These observations point to a final immorality of deadly surveillance: drones are in their psychological impact indiscriminate weapons. The population living under drones in the FATA of Pakistan can hear or see the drones and generally suspects their presence. Everyone is swept up in the surveillance, and living under drones is living under constant fear since, even as a civilian, one may at given moment be wounded or killed: one may be struck on basis of flawed intelligence, a misidentification may occur, or one may become "collateral damage." Thus the "God hurtling thunderbolts from afar" is terrorizing local people because they may be struck by lightning at any moment and they do not know how to appease this god.
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Drone Warfare: Restrictions or Abolition?
Drones set the stage for UAVs that fly without a remote control pilot and autonomously make the decision to kill. Some events in recent years suggest that a treaty banning such autonomous drones or, more broadly, a ban on lethal autonomous systems as such (including killer robots on land or at sea), might be politically feasible. In 2012, Human Rights Watch and the International
Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School called for such a ban. In the same year, the Department of Defense issued a directive on "Autonomy in Weapon Systems," prohibiting the development of fully autonomous systems for five years. 61 In April 2013, Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, wrote a comprehensive report on "lethal autonomous robotics" (LARs), noting that "there is widespread concern that allowing LARs to kill people may denigrate the value of life itself." Heyns called on all countries "to declare and implement national moratoria on at least the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of LARs until such time as an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of LARs has been established." 62 We have seen that a good case can be made that the targeted killing by drones in nonbattlefield zones violates international law. Thus we may seek to curtail drone warfare by insisting on a stricter adherence to international law and also by seeking a ban on fully autonomous drones. Would this not be more tenable than seeking a ban on all weaponized drones? It is to be granted that the restrictions would be significant steps forward in seeking a less violent world. Still, I also hold for several reasons that the arduous and more uphill battle of seeking a ban of all weaponized drones should not be set aside. First, it remains a problem that drones make conventional war easier. What will greatly add to this problem is the proliferation of drones, including the global spread of many different types of remote control weapons in development (combat UAVs, UUVs, etc.). Eventually, there will be a thin line between advanced remote control war and war with LAWS, and this line may be crossed, notwithstanding an international ban on LAWS, in the name of "military necessity." In fact, some AI scientists and weapons specialists argue that we are already crossing into the territory of full autonomy. 65 A ban on weaponized drones avoids these proliferation dangers and risks. Second, the insistence that targeted killing by drones outside legally recognized war zones violates the legal rules of legitimate initiation and execution of military force will be ineffective if a gradual understanding emerges that such targeted killing is subject to a new set of rules intermediate between the war and law-enforcement models of using lethal force. Finally, a ban on weaponized drones is needed because lethal surveillance is an affront to humanity, and this surveillance is not limited to targeted killing in non-battlefield zones, but also might occur in war zones and in the context of controlling domestic space. 
